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Abstract
Resorting to the method proposed by Matsuyama (2013), this paper develops a static equi-
librium model of a system of cities in which ex ante identical locations specialize in stages of
production different in the degree of dependence on routine and nonroutine local services sec-
tors, the latter of which is tied to an agglomeration force due to monopolistic competition a´ la
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The model is simple in that the system is summarized by a second-order
differential equation, which has a unique non-degenerate city size distribution with the comove-
ment of income, population, factor prices, and urban diversity as observed for the U.S. cities.
Two examples of use of the model are then illustrated: analyses of welfare gain from functional
specialization and optimal income redistribution, the latter of which provides an important impli-
cation of an increasing importance of interactive activities in a modern developed economy for
income redistribution. Although extending the model makes the model analytically intractable,
it is still characterized by a differential equation easily solved with a numerical method and thus
useful for further analyses.
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1 Introduction
Urban economics is now undergoing a refinement of traditional thinking, recognizing the increas-
ing importance of functional specialization as a modern form of urban specialization (Duranton and
Puga, 2005). A similar phenomenon has also been observed in trade literatures which stress task
trade between countries (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). However, what distinguishes this
refinement in urban economics from that in trade literatures is the focus of economists on the relation
of functions with urban diversity. In their seminal work, Duranton and Puga (2001) discuss func-
tional specialization of cities. Some cities specialize in the development of new products and their
appropriate production technologies, whereas the others specialize in stylized production based on
the methods developed in the former cities.2 Urban diversity, which generally involves a network of
people with different ideas, helps to provide solutions to particular problems or develop new ideas,
acting as an agglomeration force or so-called urbanization economies (Jacobs, 1969). Due to this
agglomeration force, cities can exist even if they face substantial congestion diseconomies.3 The spe-
cialization of cities by function then results in regional disparities reflecting variations in the relative
magnitudes of these counteracting forces.
The purpose of this paper is to formalize the above modern story of urban specialization into
a model which is simple enough to serve as a tool for analyses of important issues to be analyzed
in a system of cities framework. To this end, we extend Matsuyama’s (2013) international trade
model to a spatial equilibrium model of a system of cities with a continuum of stages of produc-
tion in which ex ante identical locations specialize ex post in different sets of stages of production.
Each stage of production differs in the degree of dependence on routine and nonroutine local services
sectors, characterized by perfect competition and monopolistic competition a´ la Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977), respectively, and those with higher skill intensity, higher cost share of the nonroutine lo-
cal services, benefit more from varieties of nonroutine local services or urban diversity facilitating
complex problem-solving activities. Therefore, urban diversity acts as an agglomeration force, that
ensures that concentration into a particular location is sustainable despite being associated with a
higher rental price of land which constitutes production inputs together with labor and is also con-
sumed by households. Specialization of cities then, by generating differences in the average skill
intensity among cities, results in a non-degenerate city size distribution. As in Matsuyama (2013),
an equilibrium is characterized as a single, second-order difference or differential equation which we
call the fundamental equation.
Using the model, we first show that an equilibrium with functional specialization of cities exists
2 More precisely, the model provided by Duranton and Puga (2001) is the one of process innovation. However, the same
mechanism seems to work in the case of product innovation. Empirical studies such as Feldman and Audretsch (1999)
suggest this type of mechanism.
3 Empirical studies such as Feldman and Audretsch (1999) and Davis and Henderson (2008) support this line of thinking
by veri fying the importance of urban diversity and differentiated local service supplies in promoting innovative activities
and enhancing the productivity of firms. Furthermore, the increasing importance of interactive tasks empirically shown by
Michaels et al. (2013) indirectly suggests urban diversity as a clue to understanding modern urban agglomeration.
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and is unique in the sense that there exists a unique, non-degenerate size distribution of cities. Further-
more, this equilibrium is shown to be characterized by the comovement of income, population, the
wage rate, the land rent, the average establishment size (in the monopolistic competition sector), and
the number of varieties of local nonroutine services, being actually observed for the U.S. metropolitan
areas. The analytical tractability of the model also allows us to derive the necessary and sufficient
condition for the size distribution of cities to obey a power law including Zipf’s law as a special case.
We then illustrate two examples of use of the model: analyses of welfare gains from functional
specialization and income redistribution, the latter of which focuses on a second-best allocation
achieved under a lump-sum transfer scheme and the assumption that firms in the monopolistically
competitive sector can set their own prices. Although we need to resort to numerical methods, com-
putation is easy because an equilibrium of an extended model is still characterized as a single, second-
order differential equation.
In the first example, it is shown that, for an empirically plausible range of parameter values,
the (static) welfare gain from functional specialization is large, e.g., more than about 25% increase
in life-time utility. Although negative welfare effects of higher land rents in top cities due to the
concentration of economic activity is severe, functional specialization generates a strong positive
welfare effect of urban diversity, which dominates all welfare effects and thus implies a positive
correlation between the overall welfare gain from functional specialization and the welfare gain due
to urban diversity. The welfare gain is strengthened when the elasticity of substitution decreases and
when the distribution of skill intensity of production process is diverse because that magnifies benefits
from specialization.
The second example provides an important implication of the increasing importance of interactive
activities in a modern developed economy, reported by Michaels et al. (2013), for income redistribu-
tion: the desirable income redistribution depends on types of the change in the nature of production
technology. More specifically, in our model, the increasing importance of interactiveness can be
interpreted as a shift of the distribution of skill intensity to the right or a lower elasticity of substi-
tution. On one hand, the former always implies a decrease in the optimal income tax rate simply
because an increasing dominance of monopolistically competition makes the difference between the
laissez-faire and the second-best allocations smaller by definition. On the other hand, the effect of
the latter depends on cases because the optimal tax rate is monotonically increasing in the elasticity
of substitution if the distribution of skill intensity is sufficiently skewed to the right, otherwise there
is an inversed-U-shaped relationship. When the distribution of skill intensity is highly skewed to the
right, the economy is dominated by the monopolistically competitive sector, implying less room of
income redistribution motivated by the composition of constant and increasing returns. In this case,
an increase in the elasticity of substitution favors more dispersed economic activity simply because of
limited supply of land. However, if the distribution of skill intensity is not so skewed to the right, the
laissez-faire is distant from the second-best allocation, implying more room for income redistribu-
tion. This is especially relevant for a lower elasticity of substitution which is associated with a greater
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concentration of economic activity and thus sever negative welfare effects of higher land rents. The
associated welfare gain from income redistribution is limited, e.g., less than about 2.3% increase in
life-time utility in the most of an empirically relevant range of parameters, consistent with Desmet
and Rossi-Hansberg (2013).
This paper is related to three strands of literature. The first strand is the literature on the interna-
tional trade theory of Ricardian comparative advantage. We extend the Matsuyama’s (2013) model
to a regional context and also go a step further by conducting a welfare analysis of income redistri-
bution. He introduces monopolistic competition a` la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) into Dornbusch et al.
(1977), resulting in a model with symmetry break through endogenous comparative advantage. He
also develops a new method allowing us to characterize an equilibrium of the world with multiple and
arbitrarily large number of countries as a second-order difference or differential equation, the latter
of which is analytically solvable. Our model has the same degree of analytical tractability as in Mat-
suyama’s (2013) international case, even if we include migration across cities and an immobile factor
of land, that is used not only for production but also for consumption as in Pflu¨ger and Tabuchi (2010).
The current urban application of Ricard’s theory with endogenous comparative advantage brings us
a clear relationship between comparative advantage and agglomeration and dispersion forces of eco-
nomic activity.
The second strand of literature is the research on a system of cities. To our knowledge, this is
the first paper that, using a system of cities model with functional specialization, conducts a welfare
analysis of an optimal income redistribution policy. Economic theories of the size distribution of
cities range from stochastic growth models to static deterministic ones. Some models of the former
type such as Eeckhout (2004) do not focus on the specialization of cities, whereas models such as
Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) and Duranton (2007) (of the former type) and Hsu (2012) (of the
latter type) focus on cross-city variation in industries. Recent studies by Behrens et al. (2014a) and
Behrens et al. (2014b) advance our understanding on the effects of heterogeneous agents and urban
amenities on the size distribution of cities, respectively. However, the main focus of the above studies
is on the positive side. While providing a model of a system of cities with functional specialization,
Duranton and Puga (2005) preclude the possibility of an income redistribution policy by introducing
competitive developers a´ la Henderson (1974). From a different perspective, Desmet and Rossi-
Hansberg (2013) advances our understanding on welfare effects of efficiency, amenities, and frictions
by applying the Business Cycle Accounting method in the macroeconomics literature to the urban
context, but an optimal redistribution is not their scope of analysis.
The third is trade models which specify the production of goods as a continuum of intermediate
goods, stages of production or tasks. The current model does not include trade costs of stages of
production for analytical tractability and thus heterogeneous trade costs, introduced by Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). In this sense, the model specification is somewhat similar to previous
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international trade models.4 Instead of heterogeneous trade costs, heterogeneity in skill intensity
allows the fraction of stages of production is determined endogenously, reflecting their skill intensities
and the comparative advantages of cities, the latter of which are in turn determined endogenously, i.e.,
a circular causation process.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first provide the model in Section 2. In
Section 3, we discuss the equilibrium properties including the welfare gain from functional special-
ization. The model is then extended by introducing an income redistribution policy using an income
tax and lump-sum transfers across cities to analyze the optimal income redistribution policy in Section
4. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 5.
2 The Model
In this section, we provide a simple spatial equilibrium model with a continuum of stages of produc-
tion with heterogeneity in skill intensity that are fragmented and outputs of which are traded across
cities and within firms. The economic agents consist of mobile workers, final good firms, and city-
specific local services firms, the last of which include monopolistically competitive and perfectly
competitive firms. Here, local services firms provide outsourcing services that are necessary for con-
ducting stages of production, and the variety effect introduced via monopolistic competition a´ la Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) captures urban diversity. In the latter sense, we call the monopolistically compet-
itive sector the nonroutine sector and the other the routine sector. This stylized specification makes
clear the distinction between the two sectors in a way that the nonroutine sector conducts nonroutine
tasks that often require complex problem-solving activities which could be facilitated with the help
of local network. The model is essentially an application of Matsuyama’s (2013) framework to the
urban context.
In the following, we explain the optimization problems of the agents in order. For the sake of
convenience, we first assume that there are J 2 N ex ante identical locations in the economy,5 each
of which is endowed with one unit of land. We subsequently modify this assumption by making J
diverge to infinity but making the measure of each location converges to zero in such a way that the
total measure of locations is equal to unity, which allows us to consider the size distribution of cities.6
4 The current model differs from these studies in more respects. Unlike Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), each
task is not related to a particular production factor. Rather, all tasks use the same set of production inputs; the skill intensity
of each task is different from each other; and there is a continuous distribution of such skill intensity. In this sense, except
for the use of labor and land instead of labor and capital as production inputs, the specification of our model is close to
those of Dixit and Grossman (1982), Yi (2003), and Kohler (2004). However, the current model also shares the same
assumption with Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) as well as Feenstra and Hanson (1996) in that there is no vertical
linkage between different tasks or between intermediate inputs. Importantly, the current model differs from all these studies
in that it deals with an arbitrarily large number of locations rather than just two countries or a single small open economy.
5 In this paper, we do not distinguish cities, regions, and locations and use these words interchangeably.
6 Whether the distribution corresponding to a discrete J converges to that with J =¥ as J increases itself is an important
research topic. However, answering such a question is beyond the scope of this paper. In the following, we simply assume
that the case of J = ¥ can approximate the one with a large J, or we focus only on the limiting case.
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2.1 Workers
There is a unit mass of identical workers in the economy. Each worker is freely mobile across loca-
tions and thus decides her location as well as consumption of goods and services.
Suppose that a worker had already chosen her residence j 2 f1;2;    ;Jg, which is also her work-
place. Then, she solves the following utility maximization problem:
U j = max
c j;h j0
c1 aj h
a
j s:t: Pc j+R jh j =Wj+ R¯ j; 0< a< 1:
Her income consists of labor incomeWj and subsidy R¯ j.7 Assuming that the land rents in a city are
received by the residents of that city as in Behrens et al. (2014b) and Michaels et al. (2013), R¯ j is
given by
R¯ j =
R j
N j
8 j:(1)
She uses these sources of income to consume homogeneous tradeable good c j and housing h j, the
prices of which are P and R j, respectively.
The associated indirect utility function, together with free migration, then implies
Wj+ R¯ j
Wj0 + R¯ j0
=

R j
R j0
a
8 j 6= j0;(2)
which imposes a restriction on the relationship between income and land rent differentials.
2.2 Final Good Sector
The tradeable homogeneous final good is produced using a constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) Cobb-
Douglas production technology. More specifically, the production of one unit of the final good re-
quires to process a continuum of stages of production (hereafter, stages) ft : 0 t  1g:8
Y = exp
Z 1
0
ln(y(t))dt

;(3)
where Y and y(t) denote outputs of the final good and stage t, respectively. The equal weights and
unit mass of the stages imply that the total sales, which are equal to the economy-wide income E =
7 We assume that each worker is endowed with one unit of time and supplies it inelastically. As discussed later, there
are two different sectors, the nonroutine and routine sectors, that mainly conduct nonroutine and routine tasks, respectively.
For simplicity, we assume that each worker has an equal ability to perform each type of task. Thus, in an equilibrium where
both sectors locate at almost every locations, wages rates within each location are equalized.
8 In Matsuyama (2013), what we consider to be a continuum of stages of production here is interpreted as a continuum
of sectors, and the technology specified by (3) directly enters the utility function. However, in the regional context, this
interpretation is not favorable given the transition from sectoral specialization of cities to functional one argued by Duranton
and Puga (2005).
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åJj=1(WjN j +R j) times the expenditure share (1 a) of the final good, are distributed to each stage
t.
Firms decide where each of these stages is performed. For each fixed stage t 2 [0;1], a typical
firm decides the quantity y j(t) of production of stage t at a location j 2 f1;2;    ;Jg. Once the stage
has been processed at each location, outputs fy j(t)gJj=1 are aggregated and transported without cost
to use them as a production input of the final good:9
y(t) =
J
å
j=1
y j(t) 8t:(4)
Furthermore, stage t is processed at location j with the help of the outsourcing services by local
nonroutine services Xn; j(t) and local routine services Xr; j(t). Its output y j(t) is given by10
y j(t) = Xn; j(t)g(t)Xr; j(t)1 g(t) 8 j; t;(5)
where g(t) 2 [0;1] represents the skill intensity of stage t. In the following, we assume that g(t) is
strictly monotonically increasing. For analytical convenience, we also assume that g(t) is continu-
ously differentiable, i.e., g0(t)> 0 for all t. We also assume that g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
Therefore, letting Pn; j and Pr; j denote the prices of the nonroutine and routine services, respec-
tively, we can write the profit maximization of the final good firm as follows:
maxPY  
J
å
j=1
Z
T j
[Pn; jXn; j(t)+Pr; jXr; j(t)]dt s:t: (3)  (5); and T j  [0;1];
where the control variables consist of the measurable set T j of stages processed at location j as well
as quantities (Y;fy(t)gt ;fy j(t);Xn; j(t);Xr; j(t)g j;t). Defining jT jj as the Lebesgue measure of T j, we
can see that if T j’s are all mutually exclusive, which is indeed the case, jT jj fraction of the total sales
(1 a)E is distributed to location j. In addition, g(t) and 1 g(t) fractions of the distribution (1 a)E
to stage t are distributed to the nonroutine and routine sectors, respectively. Thus, the nonroutine
sector at location j receives
R
T j g(t)dt(1 a)E  G jjT jj(1 a)E, where G j  jT jj 1
R
T j g(t)dt is the
average skill-intensity of location j.
In addition, as we discuss in the next two subsections, we assume that the market structures of the
nonroutine and routine sectors are monopolistically and perfectly competitive, respectively.11 More
9 Transportation costs can be introduced by dividing goods and services into tradeable and non-tradeable parts with
CRS Cobb-Douglas composite technology, where the share parameter corresponding to the tradeable is interpreted as the
freeness of trade.
10The implicit assumption here is that either type of local services alone cannot be traded across locations. This exactly
corresponds to what we do when communicating with people in different locations. For example, sending an interesting
idea to your friend via e-mail breaks down to two stages: developing or formulating the idea, a nonroutine task, and writing
or sending an e-mail, a routine task. Although each task is not tradeable itself, the output, i.e., the combination of those
tasks, is now tradeable.
11 This stylized specification reflects our view of the nature of nonroutine services such as management, research and
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specifically, Xn; j(t) denotes the composite of a continuum of varieties fxn; j(v; t)gv2[0;D j]. The quantity
of each variety is also a control variable, with the following technology:
Xn; j(t) =
Z D j
0
xn; j(v; t)
s 1
s dv
 s
s 1
8 j; t 2 T j;
where D j is the number of varieties produced at location j, which we call urban diversity, and s> 1
is the elasticity of substitution between any two different varieties.
The profit maximization then implies the following demand for variety v from stage t processed
at location j:
xn; j(v; t) =

pn; j(v)
Pn; j
 s
Xn; j(t) 8v; j; t 2 T j;
where Pn; j is the price index of the nonroutine services at location j given by
Pn; j =
Z D j
0
pn; j(v) 
1
q dv
 q
8 j:(6)
Here, q 1=(s 1).
2.3 Nonroutine Local Service Sector
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the nonroutine local service sector is characterized by mo-
nopolistic competition a´ la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and each firm produces one variety. In addition,
as in Pflu¨ger and Tabuchi (2010), we assume that production inputs consist of both labor and land.
More specifically, the fixed and marginal costs of production are both measured in terms of their
Cobb-Douglas composite with a cost share parameter b 2 (0;1) for land.
Formally, variety-v firm at location j solves
p j(v) = max
pn; j(v);q j(v)
h
pn; j(v) mRbjW 1 bj
i
q j(v) RbjW 1 bj f s:t: q j(v) =
Z
T j
xn; j(v; t)dt;
where q j(v) is the output of variety-v firm at location j, and m and f denote the shift parameters of
marginal and fixed costs, respectively.
The profit maximization then implies the optimal pricing rule specified by pn; j(v)= (1+q)mR
b
jW
1 b
j ,
and substituting this into (6) and taking the ratio across two different locations, j and j0, we obtain
Pn; j
Pn; j0
=

R j
R j0
bWj
Wj0
1 bD j
D j0
 q
8 j 6= j0:(7)
development, and legal services as well as routine services such as line production based on previously developed blueprints.
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2.4 Routine Local Service Sector
Unlike the nonroutine local service sector, the routine sector is characterized by perfect competition
with a CRS Cobb-Douglas production technology:
max
Hr; j; Lr; j
Pr; jH
b
r; jL
1 b
r; j  R jHr; j WjLr; j:
Note that the production of routine services also requires both labor and land. For simplicity, we
assume the same cost share parameter b as in the nonroutine sector.12
The profit maximization then implies
Pr; j
Pr; j0
=

R j
R j0
bWj
Wj0
1 b
8 j 6= j0:(8)
2.5 Equilibrium
We now define a market equilibrium. Since the locations are ex ante identical by assumption, the
symmetric configuration always exists. However, this configuration does not seem robust to exoge-
nous shocks to the economy, and thus, we focus on another type of equilibrium, which is the only
equilibrium other than the symmetric one and which is unique at least in the limiting case J ! ¥,
which is of general interest.
Specifically, we define an equilibrium with rankings. Without loss of generality, assume that
0 < jT1j < jT2j <    < jT j 1j < jT jj <    < jTJj, i.e., as j increases, the associated market share
increases. It is then immediately demonstrated that there must exist an increasing sequence fTjgJj=0
of thresholds such that T j = (Tj 1;Tj] for all j 2 f1;2;    ;Jg; T0 = 0; and TJ = 1 under free migration
and free entry into the nonroutine sector. That is, if cities are different, we observe a perfect sorting
of stages of production,13 and the higher the location index j is, the higher the average skill intensity
G j is. Note that this configuration of the equilibrium is consistent with the argument advanced by
Duranton and Puga (2001) that cities sort themselves into specialized cities, some of which host the
research and development sectors testing prototype products, while others host the production sectors
producing goods in a stylized manner. It should, however, be noted that in our model, there is no per-
fect specialization with respect to the service sectors in the sense that every city hosts both nonroutine
and routine service sectors. Stated differently, the important characteristic that distinguishes one city
from another is its average skill-intensity.
Therefore, we call the equilibrium on which we focus a sorting equilibrium and define it as
follows:
12 More precisely, there are two reasons why we introduce this assumption. The first is for simplicity. Without this
assumption, we cannot obtain the analytical solution discussed later. The second is to make clear the distinction between
the two local services sectors. With this assumption, the nonroutine sector differs from the routine one in one way, market
structure.
13 Section A explains why the economy exhibits a perfect sorting in equilibrium.
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Definition 1. A sorting equilibrium is a set of prices (P;fPn; j;Pr; j;R j;Wjg j;fpn; j(v)gv; j), quantities
(Y;fc j;h j;Hr; j;Lr; jg j;fy(t)gtfy j(t);Xn; j(t);Xr; j(t)g j;t ;fxn; j(v; t)gv;t; j;fq j(v)gv), transfers fR¯ jg j, pop-
ulations fN jg j, diversities fD jg j, and a sequence fTjgJj=0 of thresholds such that
1. workers maximize their utility by choosing quantities and locations;
2. firms maximize their profits;
3. markets clear:
(Land) R j = (1 a)bjT jjE+a(WjN j+ R¯ jN j);(9)
(Labor) WjN j = (1 a)(1 b)jT jjE;(10)
4. there is free entry into the nonroutine local service sectors; and
5. thresholds fTjgJj=0 are consistent with comparative advantage:
Pn; j+1
Pn; j
g(Tj)Pr; j+1
Pr; j
1 g(Tj)
= 1;(11)
where Pn; j+1=Pn; j < 1 and Pr; j+1=Pr; j > 1 for all j.
Here, the market clearing conditions, i.e., (9) and (10), are evident from the specifications of
the utility and production technologies presented in the previous subsections.14 The conditions that
Pn; j+1=Pn; j < 1 and Pr; j+1=Pr; j > 1 imply that location j+1, compared to location j, has a comparative
advantage in the nonroutine service sector and thus has a comparative advantage in stages with higher
skill intensity. The threshold Tj here is the stage for which locations j and j+ 1 have the same
comparative advantage, i.e., both locations j and j+1 have the same unit cost of producing stage Tj
output.
3 Equilibrium Properties
In this section, we first consolidate the equilibrium conditions presented in the previous section to
obtain an equation governing the equilibrium of the economy in Subsection 3.1. We then prove the
existence and uniqueness of a sorting equilibrium in Subsection 3.2, which has clear and empirically
valid predictions about the relationships between the city size and some variables. The relation of our
model to the size distribution of cities is also derived in Subsection 3.3.
14The market clearing condition for the final good is PY = E, where P denotes the price index of the final good. We omit
this condition from the definition because we do not use it in deriving analytical results presented in the next section.
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3.1 Fundamental Equation
For a given J, we first show that the equilibrium system of the economy reduces to the following
fundamental equation:
Tj+1 Tj
Tj Tj 1
a(1 b)+b (1 a)(1 b)qg(Tj)
=

G j+1
G j
qg(Tj)
8 j 2 f1;2;    ;J 1g;
with T0 = 0 and TJ = 1. Given the definition of G j, i.e., G j = jTj Tj 1j 1
R Tj
Tj 1 g(t)dt, the fundamental
equation is a second-order difference equation with two boundary conditions.
For this purpose, we start with the result that consolidating market clearing conditions (9) and
(10) along with the distribution of land rents, (1), yields
R j+1
R j
=
Wj+1N j+1+R j+1
WjN j+R j
=
jT j+1j
jT jj 8 j:(12)
That is, given the ordering of jT jj, the higher the market share jT jj is, the higher the land rent R j and
regional incomeWjN j +R j  E j are. In addition, it is also implied that differentials of land rent R j
and market share jT jj are equal. That R j < R j+1 is simply because both locations have the same area
of land while income concentrates in location j+1.
This result is then combined with the free-migration condition (2) to obtain
N j+1
N j
=
 jT j+1j
jT jj
1 a
8 j;(13)
which states that the ordering of population N j is the same as the market share jT jj, and that the
differential of population N j is less than proportional to that of the market share jT jj or, using (12),
the land rent R j or local income E j. The latter is interpreted as the spatial equilibrium imposing some
upper bound on the population differential. As a result, the ordering of the wage rateWj is also the
same as jT jj because the labor market clearing condition (10) implies that the differential of labor
compensationWjN j is equal to that of the market share jT jj:
Wj+1
Wj
=
 jT j+1j
jT jj
a
8 j:(14)
That Wj <Wj+1 is interpreted as a differential compensating the disparity in the cost of living, i.e.,
R j < R j+1. The spatial equilibrium (2) limits the degree of the wage differential, allowing the co-
movement between the wage rate and population.
These results immediately imply that a higher market share jT jj is associated with more severe
market competition, which is a dispersion force, in the sense that the unit production cost and thus the
price Pr; j of the routine local services is higher in that location. More specifically, substituting (12)
11
and (14) into (8), we obtain
Pr; j+1
Pr; j
=
 jT j+1j
jT jj
a(1 b)+b
8 j:(15)
Another important implication of this result is that a location with a higher market share jT jj
exhibits comparative advantage in the production of nonroutine services. This can be seen from the
determination of urban diversity, a factor that generates comparative advantage in nonroutine services.
Substituting (7), (12), (14) and (15) into (11), we obtain
R j+1
R j
bWj+1
Wj
1 b
=

D j+1
D j
qg(Tj)
, or
 jT j+1j
jT jj
a(1 b)+b
=

D j+1
D j
qg(Tj)
for all j. That is, if a sorting equilibrium exists, more severe market competition, i.e., higher wage
rage and land rent, in a location with a higher market share jT jj are associated with greater urban
diversity D j, leading the location to exhibit comparative advantage in the production of nonroutine
services. We here observe an agglomeration force represented by urban diversity D j. Therefore, we
can see that in this model, there is a close relationship between these agglomeration and dispersion
forces through regional comparative advantage, which is a result of the fragmentation of production
stages across locations. In a sorting equilibrium, if it were to exist, regional disparities would emerge
as a balance between the agglomeration and dispersion forces,15 and this balance would be affected
by functional specialization of locations reflecting the function g(t) and, thus, the distribution of the
skill intensities in the economy.
Finally, by utilizing the free-entry condition for the nonroutine sector, we can derive the fun-
damental equation. First, note that the free entry, p j(v) = 0 for all v and j, together with the
optimal pricing rule, implies that the output q j(v) of each variety v at location j is constant, i.e.,
q j(v) = f=(qm)  q for all v and j. Then, the market clearing condition for the nonroutine sector
yields D jpn; jq= (1 a)G jjT jjE, or taking the ratio of this equation, we obtain
D j+1
D j
=
G j+1
G j
jT j+1j
jT jj

pn; j+1
pn; j
 1
=
G j+1
G j
 jT j+1j
jT jj
(1 a)(1 b)
8 j:
To avoid this arbitrariness of the finiteness of J, we investigate the distribution of cities in a sorting
equilibrium. We accomplish this by making J diverge to infinity while limiting the total measure of
cities to unity.16 Then, applying the Matsuyama’s (2013) method to the fundamental equation,17
15 Note that the equality between agglomeration and dispersion forces holds at a threshold Tj. Since
R j+1=R j;W j+1=W j;D j+1=D j > 1 and g(t) is increasing in t, compared with location j, location j+ 1 has comparative
advantage in stage t > Tj due to dominance of agglomeration force over dispersion force implying lower unit costs of
conducting more skill-intensive tasks.
16Note that the unit endowment of land is fixed for each location.
17 Essentially, the method involves interpreting 1=J as a differential dt when J is sufficiently large and then applying the
asymptotic expansion. Here, it is crucial that as J diverges to infinity, each city hosts only one stage of production in the
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we obtain the following boundary value problem for a second-order ordinary differential equation
(ODE):
F00
F0
=
qg0(F)F0
G(F)
with F(0) = 0 and F(1) = 1;(16)
where
G(F) a(1 b)+b  (1 a)(1 b)qg(F):
Each city is characterized by the stage t that it hosts because as J diverges to infinity, jT jj converges
to zero or, stated differently, T j converges to a point that characterizes one of the cities. Here, F(t)
is the Lorenz curve of the market share that corresponds to å jk=1 jTkj for some j. Thus, given the
uniformity of stage t, F0(t) corresponds to jT jj, the market share of a location. In the following,
given the one-to-one correspondence between a city and a stage, we call the city that hosts stage t city
t. We assume that G(1)> 0 in order to focus on a meaningful case.18
3.2 Existence and Uniqueness of Endogenous Rankings
In order to prove the existence of a sorting equilibrium in the limiting case, it suffices to show that
there exists a solution to the fundamental equation (16). Importantly, we can obtain a unique solution
to the fundamental equation analytically, which also implies the uniqueness of a sorting equilibrium.
The economic interpretation of this result is as follows: although cities may differ, the associated
variations in city characteristics are limited to a range that is consistent with the unique distribution.
Since cities are ex ante identical, we cannot identify which stage of production each city specializes
in ex post.19
More specifically, we obtain the inverse function of the Lorenz curve (let H : z! t denote the
function, i.e., H(z)F 1(z)):
H(z) =
R z
0 G(u)
1
(1 a)(1 b) duR 1
0 G(u)
1
(1 a)(1 b) du
8z 2 [0;1]:(17)
For a given g(t), this equation yields a unique inverse Lorenz curve H(z). Given that H 0(z) > 0 and
H 00(z)< 0 for all t, F(t) is unique and has a property: F0(t)> 0 and F00(t)> 0.
limit and thus is characterized by t.
18 Intuitively, this assumption implies that the magnitude of market competition, i.e., the power a(1 b)+b appearing
in the fundamental equation, is larger than that of the agglomeration force, (1 a)(1  b)qg(t), net of the effect of the
average skill intensity G j, thus resulting in “bounded” city sizes. It can be easily shown that as G(1) converges to zero from
above, the max-min ratio of population diverges to infinity.
19 This resembles the implication of a stochastic process that is specified by a Markov chain with a non-degenerate
unique invariant distribution. That is, the realization of a random variable varies randomly in a manner that is consistent
with the invariant distribution. Importantly, this uniqueness of the sorting equilibrium allows us to conduct the numerical
exercises discussed later. If we have a cross-sectional dataset of cities, we can calibrate the model.
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Then, using this result and normalizing the economy-wide income E to unity without loss of
generality, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose that g0(t) > 0 and G(1) > 0. Then, a sorting equilibrium, characterized by
a Lorenz curve of the market size F(t), exists and is unique. In addition, this equilibrium has the
following properties: The market share E(t) of city t is given by F0(t), and population N(t), land
rent R(t), wage rate W (t), diversity D(t) and the average establishment size z(t) (in the nonroutine
sector) in city t are given by
N(t) =
F0(t)1 aR 1
0 F0(t)1 adt
;
R(t) = [a(1 b)+b]F0(t);
W (t) = (1 a)(1 b)
Z 1
0
F0(t)1 adtF0(t)a;
D(t) =
q
(1+q) f
1 a
[a(1 b)+b]b

(1 a)(1 b)
Z 1
0
F0(t)1 adt
 (1 b)
g(F(t))F0(t)(1 a)(1 b);
z(t) =
(1+q) f
q
(1 b)[a(1 b)+b]b

(1 a)(1 b)
Z 1
0
F0(t)1 adt
 b
F0(t)(1 a)b
for all t 2 [0;1]. Therefore, as t increases, i.e., as a location specializes in a more nonroutine stage of
production, the values of all of these variables increase.
Proof. The market share F0(t) is simply a definition. Population function N(t) follows if we apply
the asymptotic expansion to (13):
N(t+Dt)
N(t)
=

1+
F00(t)
F0(t)
Dt+o(jDtj)
1 a
= 1+(1 a)F
00(t)
F0(t)
Dt+o(jDtj):
Arranging this result and making Dt converge to zero, we obtain
N0(t)
N(t)
= (1 a)F
00(t)
F0(t)
8t;
which, together with the normalization, i.e.,
R 1
0 N(t)dt = 1, implies the desired result of N(t). The
land rent function R(t) follows immediately from the land and labor market clearing conditions,
where jT jj is now replaced with F0(t). The wage functionW (t) also follows from the labor market
clearing condition with jT jj replaced with F0(t) and the population function N(t). The diversity
function D(t) derives from the market clearing condition for nonroutine services, i.e., D jpn; jq =
(1 a)G jjT jj= (1 a)
R Tj
Tj 1 g(t)dt, together with the results for the land rent and wage rate functions.
Here,
R Tj
Tj 1 g(t)dt is replaced with g(F(t))F
0(t). The establishment size function z(t) is given by the
consistency, i.e., the labor compensation calculated byW (t)D(t)z(t)must be equal to the market size
(1 a)F0(t) times the skill-intensity g(F(t)) times the labor share 1 b. The statement that all of
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these functions are increasing in t follows from the result that g0(t);F0(t);F00(t)> 0.
As argued in the previous subsection, the result that R0(t)> 0 derives from competition in the land
rental markets. The comovement betweenW (t) and N(t) is an implication of spatial equilibrium, and
comparative advantage leads to the result that D0(t)> 0. z0(t)> 0 because the differential of the wage
rate times the number of firms in the nonroutine sector is less than proportional to that of the market
size of the sector.20
Figure 1 confirms the prediction of the model that the variables appearing in Proposition 1 are all
positively correlated. Panel (a)-(f) in the figure plot skill intensity, the market size, the wage rate, the
land value (as a proxy for the land rent), urban diversity, and the average establishment size of the
nonroutine sector, respectively, against the total employment size, which corresponds to population in
the model, for Metropolitan Statistical Areas (hereafter, MSAs) using the data explained in the next
two paragraphs. Each of the panels also depicts a red line corresponding to the linear regression. We
observe that there are positive correlations between the variables in Proposition 1. Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficients of the panels are 0.650, 0.994, 0.503, 0.318, 0.937, and 0.471, respectively.
The data on the variables except for the last three are based on the May 2011 Occupational Em-
ployment Statistics (hereafter, OES). Skill intensity of an MSA is defined as the share of detailed
occupations listed in the Standard Occupational Classification System (hereafter, SOC), more than
20% of employments of which have a master’s degree or a higher one, in the labor compensation of
all detailed occupations reported by OES. The market size of an MSA is approximated by the total la-
bor compensation using the fact that the two are proportional in the model. The wage rate of an MSA
is the median of annual wage rates of detailed occupations in the MSA. The land value (per acre) is
taken from Table A3 in Albouy and Ehrlich (2012). As for urban diversity and the establishment size,
we calculate these as the total number of establishments and the number of employments per estab-
lishment, respectively, of “Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services” (in the North American
Industry Classification System), using the 2011 Statistics U.S. Businesses (hereafter, SUSB).
Here, we focus on the MSAs for which OES report non-military detailed occupations that cover
more than 75% of the total employments in order to reduce a sample selection bias in the correlation
between the total employment size and skill intensity.21 This results in the sample size of 303 in the
20 This is easily understood in the discrete version. Using the market clearing conditionW jD jz j =(1 a)(1 b)G jjT jjE,
we get
W j+1
W j
D j+1
D j
z j+1
z j
=
G j+1
G j
jT j+1j
jT jj :
Then, using the differentials derived in the previous subsection, we obtain
z j+1
z j
=
 jT j+1j
jT jj
(1 a)b
8 j:
21 It should be noted that the use of the employment data of detailed occupations reported by OES might result in a
selection bias in the relationship between the total employment size and skill intensity of MSAs. This is because functional
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Figure 1: Correlations
cases which use OES only, i.e., Panel (a)-(c). The sample size of Panel (d) is reduced to 160, because
the definitions of MSAs in Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) are not exactly the same as in our study, which
focuses on MSAs listed in OES.22 The sample sizes for the case of Panel (e) and (f), which use both
OES and SUSB, are in the middle of the above two cases, 279 and 278, respectively.
3.3 Size Distribution of Cities
As has been argued in the literature, the upper tail of the population size of cities in the United States
is well approximated by a power law or, more specifically, a Pareto distribution with a coefficient of
one, the so-called Zipf’s law (Gabaix and Ioannides, 2004; Gabaix, 2009). Economic mechanisms
resulting in Zipf’s law have also been proposed, ranging from random growth models such as Rossi-
Hansberg and Wright (2007) and Duranton (2007) to static models such as Hsu (2012) and ?.
The purpose of this subsection is therefore to relate our model to the size distribution of cities.
specialization across cities implies that smaller cities have a smaller share of workers working for the nonroutine sector,
i.e., detailed occupations among which 20% of employments have a master’s or a higher degree by definition, and thus OES
might tend not to report the employment or wage data on those occupations in smaller MSAs more than proportionally to
their city sizes relative to larger MSAs. If this is the case, skill intensity is biased downward for small-sized MSAs, leading
to a seemingly positive correlation between the total employment size and skill intensity. Another approach of reducing this
type of selection bias is to use the data of major (not detailed) occupations in SOC. In this case, OES report the employment
and wage data of all occupations for all MSAs. Using this more aggregated data, we still observe a positive relationship
between the total employment size and skill intensity, which is consistent with the prediction of the model.
22 We match MSAs appearing in OES with those in Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) comparing the full names of MSAs.
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More specifically, we derive the necessary and sufficient condition under which the associated sorting
equilibrium exhibits a power law including Zipf’s law as a special case. The next proposition states
that this is equivalent to identifying the functional form of g(t) guaranteeing that the size distribution
of cities obeys a power law.23
Proposition 2. The size distribution of cities in the sorting equilibrium is characterized by a truncated
Pareto distribution if and only if g(t) is given by
g(t) =
(
a fah  [ah  (a 1)h] tg 1h if h 2

  1(1 a)(1 b) ;0

[ (0;+¥)
a  expflna  [lna  ln(a 1)] tg if h= 0,
where
a a(1 b)+b
(1 a)(1 b)q > 1:
Furthermore, if h= a=[(1 a)(1 b)], the size distribution of cities is consistent with Zipf’s law.
Proof. Only the essence is discussed here. The first part of the proposition is proven in four steps:
The first step is to notice, from Proposition 1, that N(t) obeys a power law if and only if F0(t) obeys
a power law.
The second step is to show that F0(t) follows a power law if and only if l defined by l 
G(F(t)) 1 obeys a power law. In order to prove this statement, we begin by differentiating t =
H[F(t)] with respect to t to obtain 1= H 0[F(t)]F0(t). Using (17), we then obtain
F0(t) µ G(F(t)) 
1
(1 a)(1 b) :
The third step is to prove that l obeys a power law if and only if
g0

g 1(B(l))

µ lh˜; B(l) a(1 b)+b l
 1
(1 a)(1 b)q :(18)
Here, h˜ is defined by h˜ = h  1. In order to validate this statement, we first note that the density
function fZ(z) of z = F(t) is given by fZ(z) = fT [H(z)]H 0(z) = H 0(z), where the first equality uses
the relationship between t and z, i.e., t = H(z), and the second uses the uniformity of stage t. Then,
using the relationship between l and z given by l=G(z) 1 and the density function fZ(z), we obtain
the density function fL(l) of l as follows:
fL(l) = fZ

g 1(B(l))
 ¶
¶l
g 1(B(l)) µ
l 
h
1
(1 a)(1 b)+2
i
g0 [g 1(B(l))]
:
23 One might interpret this kind of approach as searching for a knife-edge condition and thus conclude that the result
presented below is not robust compared with previous theories. Testing the model, however, is not a purpose of this paper.
Proposition is simply used for calibration of the model (Subsection 3.4).
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a b s a˜ h
0.095 0.085 5.877 1.022 -0.561
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
The final step is to show that (18) holds if and only if g(t) is given by the one specified in the
proposition.
The second part of the proposition is demonstrated using the results discussed above and the fact
that a random variable X1 given by X1 = Xw2 (w > 0), where X2 follows a Pareto distribution with
coefficient d> 0, obeys a Pareto distribution with coefficient d=w.
3.4 Welfare Gain from Functional Specialization
Benchmark
As a numerical exercise, we compute the sorting equilibrium and the welfare gain from functional
specialization for an example of parameter values, where the welfare gain is defined as the difference
in log-utility between the laissez-faire case described in the previous subsections and the case where
there are continuum of locations all of which hosts the whole range of stages of production and the
same number of workers.
For this purpose, we specify the functional form of g(t) as follows:
g(t) =
(
a˜ fa˜h  [a˜h  (a˜ 1)h] tg 1h if h 6= 0,
a˜  expfln a˜  [ln a˜  ln(a˜ 1)] tg if h= 0,
where a˜> 1 is a parameter that is different from a in Proposition 2. Thus, instead of assuming an exact
power law, here we consider a slightly general g(t) that includes an exact power law as a special case.
Based on a guess that the upper tail of market sizes E(t) =F0(t) of MSAs is well approximated by a
power law, we expect that the above specification would successfully match the data.24 A benchmark
set of parameter values we use is presented in Table 1, which is obtained by the calibration described
in Appendix G.
Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium Lorenz curveF(t) and the associated profiles of population N(t),
the wage rateW (t), the land rent R(t), urban diversity D(t), and the average establishment z(t). As
predicted by Proposition 1, all functions are monotonically increasing in t.
Letting U¯ and U¯s denote utilities in the laissez-faire and symmetric cases, respectively, the welfare
24 Note that since the population N(t) of city t is proportional to the market size E(t) of city t (Proposition 1), if the
distribution of population is closed to a power law, then the market size is also close to the power law.
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Figure 2: Lorenz Curve F(t) and Profiles, N(t),W (t), R(t), D(t), z(t)
gain is given by25
lnU¯  lnU¯s =

ln

E(t)=N(t)
R(t)a

  ln

1
Ras

  (1 a)(lnP  lnPs) ;
where the first and the second terms represent the effects of the differences in the land-rent-adjusted
average income and the price index of the final good, respectively. Variables with subscript A cor-
respond to those in the symmetric case. Note that spatial equilibrium implies that the rent-adjusted
income E(t)=[N(t)R(t)a] is independent of t. Here, the price index is further decomposed as follows:
lnP  lnPs =
Z 1
0
b[lnR(t)  lnRs]F0(t)dt+
Z 1
0
(1 b)[lnW (t)  lnWs]F0(t)dt
 
Z 1
0
q [g(F(t)) lnD(t) Gs lnDs]F0(t)dt;
25Since both the total population and the measure of the continuum of locations are normalized to unity, the population
size of each location in the symmetric case is equal to unity. In addition, given the normalization of the economy-wide
income, i.e., E = 1, the per capita income of each location is also equal to one. Therefore, the symmetric outcome is
equivalent to full agglomeration, i.e., workers and stages of production all concentrate in a single location.
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Item Value (%)
Welfare Gain 1.6
Rent-adjusted Income -8.7
Final Good Price 10.3
Land Rent -7.8
Wage Rate -0.7
Urban Diversity 18.8
Table 2: Welfare Gain from Functional Specialization: Benchmark
Note: The welfare effect of each item is measured in terms of % increase in utility from the symmetric case.
where
Rs = a(1 b)+b; Ws = (1 a)(1 b);
Ds =
q(1 a)Gs
(1+q) f
R bs W
 (1 b)
s ; Gs 
Z 1
0
g(z)dz:
Table 2 reports that the welfare gain from functional specialization is about 1.6% of the utility
level in the symmetric case, implying about 40% increase in life-time utility with log utility and the
discount factor of 0.96.
The decomposition shows that the effect of the final good price slightly dominates that of the
rent-adjusted income. In each of the two effects, increases in land rents due to agglomeration play
important roles, i.e., reduce the rent-adjusted income and increase the price index of the final good.
However, a much larger positive effect, 18.8% increase in utility, is generated by urban diversity, i.e.,
agglomeration increases the number of varieties of professional services.
Robustness
How does this result depend on the elasticity s of substitution and the distribution of skill intensities
of stages of production? In order to answer this question, fixing the share parameters, a and b, and
a˜, a parameter less crucial than h in determining the distribution of skill intensity, we compute the
welfare gain for each pair (s;h) or (s;Gs) given the one-to-one correspondence between h and Gs.
Since G(1)> 0 in Proposition 1 must hold, we need the following restriction to s:
s>max

1;
1
a(1 b)+b

 5:817:
The upper bound for s is set to 10 which corresponds to the upper bound of the typical range of the
elasticity of substitution in the literatures (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). The lower and upper
bounds, -0.685 and 9.210, for h are set in such a way that the average skill intensity Gs belongs to a
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Figure 3: Density Function of Skill Intensity: Gs = 0:2;0:5;0:8
range [0:1;0:9], which covers the benchmark case, 0.882. Figure 3 depicts the density of skill intensity
for three values of the average skill intensity Gs, showing that as Gs increases, the composition of
production processes shifts toward those with higher skill intensity.
Figure 4 depicts the welfare gain and its decomposition for each pair (s;Gs) of the elasticity
of substitution and the average skill intensity as well as the benchmark case represented as a point
(5:877;0:882). Although the absolute magnitude of each decomposed term changes significantly
depending on parameter values, its relative magnitude is the same as in the benchmark case, and
the magnitude of the overall welfare gain is robustly high, e.g., in a large region of (s;Gs), the total
welfare gain is more than 1%, implying 25% increase in life-time utility.
Numerical comparative statics also shows that for a fixed average skill intensity Gs, an increase
in the elasticity s of substitution reduces the welfare gain from functional specialization; and that for
a fixed elasticity s of substitution, there is an inversed-U-shaped relationship between the average
skill intensity Gs and the overall welfare gain. The former result is interpreted that as an increase in
the elasticity s of substitution weakens the urban diversity effect, resulting in a lower overall welfare
gain. The other effects, i.e., rent-adjusted income, land rent, and wage rate, are all in the opposite
direction reflecting weaker market competition. The latter result is simply because as the density of
skill intensity concentrates on either the upper or lower corners, i.e., Gs ! 1 or Gs ! 0, heterogeneity
across production processes with respect to skill intensity disappears, leading to less benefit from
specialization or trade. This interpretation is supported by the result that each decomposed term has
the same inversed-U-shaped relationship. However, we note that the absolute magnitude of each
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Figure 4: Welfare Gain from Functional Specialization
Note: Panels show the welfare effects in terms of % increase in utility from the symmetric case. A darker color within a
fixed panel means a higher welfare gain. Colors in different panels are not comparable. The point (5:877;0:882)
represents the benchmark case. For a given triplet (a;b; a˜), there is a negative relationship between h and the average skill
intensity Gs.
effect is strengthened when the density of skill intensity is skewed to the right.
4 Welfare Analysis of Income Redistribution Policy
Finally, in order to provide an example of use of the model, we conduct a welfare analysis of an
income redistribution policy focusing on a second-best allocation, i.e., allocation achieved under the
assumption that monopolistically competitive firms can set their own price levels, as in Pflu¨ger and
Tabuchi (2010) who follow Helpman (1998).26 This kind of analysis allows us to investigate the
26 The possible source of inefficiency here is the composition of the routine and the nonroutine local services sectors.
As specified in Section 2, the latter sector is characterized by monopolistic competition a´ la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and
if the final good firm uses the nonroutine local services only, i.e., g(t)! 1 for all t, the associated laissez-faire outcome
is efficient (See the review in Dhingra and Morrow (2012) and their extension to the environments with heterogeneous
firms.) One important future direction of research could therefore be to consider a class of utility or production functions
with variable elasticity of substitution. Since it is immediate to introduce preference and production externalities into
the model, developing a method also applicable to environments with variable elasticity of substitution allows us to more
deeply understand welfare gains from optimal policy in a system of cities and the interactions among various sources of
inefficiency.
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relationship between room of policy intervention and technological environment in a framework of a
system of cities.27 For this purpose, we describe a lump-sum transfer scheme in Subsection 4.1 and
derive the modified fundamental equation in Subsection 4.2, respectively. We then conduct numerical
comparative statics to obtain implications of production technology, specifically, the pair (s;Gs) of
the elasticity of substitution and the average skill intensity, for income redistribution in Subsection
4.3.
4.1 Income Redistribution Policy Rule
We begin with a finite number of locations J. Let Eb; j and Ea; j denote before- and after- tax regional
income, respectively, i.e., Eb; j = N j(Wj+ R¯ j) =WjN j+R j. Then, let us introduce a government that
implements the following income redistribution policy rule:28
Ea; j = (1  t)Eb; j+ tEJ 8 j;
where t 2 [0;1] is the proportional income tax rate; the case where t = 0 corresponds to the laissez-
faire economy described and analyzed in the previous sections. That is, by levying a tax on individu-
als’ incomes Eb; j that are distributed by the market, the policy makes the equilibrium outcome more
equalized than in the laissez-faire case. In addition, the lump-sum transfers among cities make this
dispersion effect more effective because as individuals concentrate in a city, the per capita lump-sum
transfer within the city, i.e., tE=(JN j), decreases.
In order to reflect this government policy rule, the land market clearing and free-migration condi-
tions should be modified as
R j = (1 a)bjT jjE+aEa; j;
Ea; j+1=N j+1
Ea; j=N j
=

R j+1
R j
a
;
where Ea; j=N j represents the after-tax per capita income at location j, implying
R j+1
R j
=
(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]jT j+1j+atJ 1
(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]jT jj+atJ 1 ;
N j+1
N j
=
(1 a)(1  t)jT j+1j+ tJ 1
(1 a)(1  t)jT jj+ tJ 1

(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]jT j+1j+atJ 1
(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]jT jj+atJ 1
 a
; 8 j:
27 Although not pursued in this paper, technological externalities in both preference and technology are easily introduced
into the model with the same degree of analytical tractability, allowing us to understand the relationship between the
composition of externalities and the efficiency of market allocation.
28 The government here cannot control the distribution of population across cities directly. Instead, the choice variable
of the government is the income tax rate t only. For a given tax rate, the population distribution of cities is implicitly
determined by free migration expressed as the equalization of utility across cities. This is in contrast to the analysis in
Pflu¨ger and Tabuchi (2010) where the government controls the population distribution across (two) locations, and lump-
sum transfers are automatically implied by the free-migration condition.
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4.2 Modified Fundamental Equation
Using the modified equilibrium conditions, we obtain the following modified fundamental equation:
 jT j+1j
jT jj
1 b[1+qg(Tj)](1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]jT j+1j+atJ 1
(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]jT jj+atJ 1
[a(1 b)+b][1+qg(Tj)]


(1 a)(1  t)jT j+1j+ tJ 1
(1 a)(1  t)jT jj+ tJ 1
 (1 b)[1+qg(Tj)]
=

G j+1
G j
qg(Tj)
8 j 2 f1;2;    ;J 1g:
Replacing J 1 with Dt as J becomes sufficiently large and using the method of asymptotic expan-
sion, we obtain the fundamental equation in the limiting case:
g(F;F0)F00 = qg0(F)F0;
where
g(F;F0)  1 b[1+qg(F)]
F0
+
[a(1 b)+b][1+qg(F)]
F0+ t˜1
  (1 b)[1+qg(F)]
F0+ t˜2
;
t˜1  at
(1 a)[b+a(1 b)(1  t)] ; t˜2 
t
(1 a)(1  t) :
With t= 0, this fundamental equation reduces to the one in the laissez-faire case.
This case is clearly complicated relative to the previous one, and thus we must resort to a nu-
merical method such as the fourth-order Runge-Kutta method. It should also be noted that a solution
to this ODE is not necessarily a sorting equilibrium because, unlike in the previous case, we do not
have any analytical characterization stating that F(t) is a positive, strictly convex function. Instead,
after solving the fundamental equation numerically, we need to check whether the function F(t) has
this property.29 However, an advantageous property of this ODE is that it is very easy to check the
uniqueness of a solution for a given set of parameters. This is because we know that F(t) is a Lorenz
curve, and thus,F0(0)must be less than one. In addition, we have boundary conditions,F(0) = 0 and
F(1) = 1. Therefore, by simply discretizing the interval (0;1) and using each point as an initial guess
for F0(0), we can obtain all the possible solutions to the ODE with the help of forward shooting.
29 Using the land rent and wage rate functions stated in the next subsection, we have
PL(t) µ

(1 a)(1  t)+ t=F0(t) (1 b)(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]F0(t)+at	a(1 b)+b for all t 2 [0;1];
which implies that the price PL(t) of the routine good and thus market competition are increasing in t if (F0(t) > 0 and)
F00(t) > 0 for all t 2 [0;1]. Then, the argument in Subsection 3.1 suggests that if a solution to the fundamental equation
exists, we should have a D(t) that is increasing in t, which is the implication of endogenous comparative advantage of
cities with higher t in the nonroutine sector. That is, if a solution to the fundamental equation exists and if F0(t) > 0 and
F00(t)> 0 for all t 2 [0;1], the solution is actually a sorting equilibrium.
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4.3 Optimal Income Tax Rate
Benchmark
For the benchmark set of parameter values in Table 1, it was verified that for each t 2 [0;1], there is a
unique solution to the fundamental equation that has the property F0(t);F00(t)> 0 for all t, implying
that the solution is actually a sorting equilibrium.
Given the unique solution, the equilibrium utility is then calculated by
lnU¯ = ln

Ea(t)
N(t)R(t)a

  (1 a) lnP 8t 2 [0;1];
where
Ea(t) = [1 a(1  t)] 1[(1 a)(1  t)F0(t)+ t];
lnP =
Z 1
0
[b lnR(t)+(1 b) lnW (t) qg(F(t)) lnD(t)]F0(t)dt;
R(t) = [1 a(1  t)] 1(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]F0(t)+at	 ;
W (t) = (1 a)(1 b)F
0(t)
N(t)
;
N(t) = ec0

(1 a)(1  t)F0(t)+ t(1 a) [a(1 b)(1  t)+b]F0(t)+at	 a ;
D(t) =
q
(1+q) f
(1 a)g(F(t))F0(t)R(t) bW (t) (1 b)
for all t 2 [0;1], where ec0 is computed by integrating N(t) over [0;1] and using the normalization
condition, i.e.,
R 1
0 N(t)dt = 1. The implication of spatial equilibrium is that the first term in the above
equation is independent of location or task t such that utility is equalized across locations.30
Panel (a) in Figure 5 then depicts the consequent relationship between tax rate t and the natural
logarithm of the equilibrium utility lnU¯ , which contains a unique peak at the optimal income tax rate
of about 0.6%.31 Therefore, the laissez-faire outcome, i.e., the case of t = 0, is not efficient. Its
allocation is Pareto-dominated by the sorting equilibrium with a positive but sufficiently low income
tax rate. The optimal tax rate achieves about 0.09% higher equilibrium utility as reported in Table 3,
which corresponds to about 2.25% increase in life-time utility with log utility and the discount factor
of 0.96.
The unique peak is a result of the combination of two relationships: (i) the welfare effect of the
land-rent-adjusted income is monotonically increasing in the tax rate t; and (ii) the welfare effect
of the final good price is monotonically decreasing in the tax rate t. Panel (a) and (b) in Figure 5
30 Using the normalization condition on the population size, i.e.,
R 1
0 N(t)dt = 1, it is easily shown that
Ea(t)=[N(t)R(t)a] = [1 a(1  t)] (1 a)e c0 for all t 2 [0;1].
31 This small number is not a computational error as suggested by Panel (a) in Figure 5 and Figure 6, the latter of which
shows the optimal tax rate for each pair (s;Gs) of the elasticity of substitution and the average skill intensity.
25
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
0.
19
7
0.
19
9
0.
20
1
Panel (a)
Income Tax Rate τ
Ut
ilit
y 
(ln
)
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
Panel (b)
Income Tax Rate τ
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
Rent−adjusted Income
Final Good Price
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
Panel (c)
Income Tax Rate τ
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
Land Rent
Wage Rate
Urban Diversity
Figure 5: Income Tax t and the Equilibrium Utility (ln): Benchmark
Note: The vertical axes of all panels are measured in terms of utility. For ease of visualization, the horizontal axis covers
only a part of t, i.e., [0;0:05]. For higher t’s, the relative magnitude of each term does not change.
Item Value (%)
Welfare Gain 0.09
Rent-adjusted Income 3.63
Final Good Price -3.53
Land Rent 3.18
Wage Rate 0.24
Urban Diversity -6.95
Table 3: Welfare Gain from Optimal Income Redistribution Policy: Benchmark
Note: The welfare effect of each item is measured in terms of % increase in utility from the laissez-faire case.
suggest that for a sufficiently low tax rate, the former effect dominates, while the latter does for a
sufficiently high tax rate. As the decomposition of the welfare effect of the final good price shows
(Panel (c) in Figure 5), the latter relationship derives from the fact that the welfare effect of urban
diversity increases as the spatial distribution of economic activity concentrates, i.e., as the tax rate t
decreases. The wage rate and the land rent both become lower when economic activity is dispersed,
i.e., t is higher, suggesting that the former relationship simply reflects the relationship between the
welfare effect of the land rent and the tax rate. The decomposition of the welfare gain from the
optimal income tax reported in Table 3 confirms such relative magnitudes of welfare effects.
Robustness
Numerical comparative statics shows that the laissez-fair outcome is inefficient in the most of an
empirically plausible parameter range. The left panel in Figure 6 depicts the optimal income tax rate
corresponding to each pair (s;Gs) of the elasticity of substitution and the average skill intensity in
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percentage terms.32 It shows that the optimal tax rate is positive in the range, implying that the laissez-
fair is characterized as excess agglomeration. This result agree with the one reported by Pflu¨ger and
Tabuchi (2010), who, using a New Economic Geography model, argue that with land use in both
consumption and production, the spatial configuration is characterized by either efficient or excess
agglomeration.
Although the optimal tax rate changes depending on parameter values, we observe systematic
variations: For a fixed elasticity s of substitution, the optimal tax rate is monotonically decreasing in
the average skill intensity Gs and approaching to zero as Gs increases to one; and, for a fixed average
skill intensity Gs, the optimal tax rate is monotonically increasing in the elasticity s of substitution if
Gs is sufficiently high and has an inversed-U-shaped relationship otherwise (the right panel in Figure
6). The former result is interpreted as the combination of two key results. On one hand, if the
average skill intensity Gs is sufficiently close to unity, the density of skill intensity is highly skewed
to the right (Figure 3), making almost every production processes to use inputs produced by the
monopolistically competitive sector and thus suggesting that the laissez-faire is close to the second-
best allocation by definition. On the other hand, as the average skill intensity Gs decreases, production
technology exhibits constant returns more, and, given limited land areas generating a dispersion force,
it is implied that the optimal allocation is more dispersed than the laissez faire.
The first part of the latter result is interpreted in a similar way to the former case. That is, as
the elasticity s of substitution increases, production technology exhibits constant returns to a greater
extent, favoring more dispersed economic activity as the optimal. In the second part, where the
average skill intensity Gs is not close to unity, the laissez-faire outcome is distant from the second-best
allocation by definition, implying more room for income redistribution. This is especially relevant for
lower s which is associated with a greater concentration of economic activity and thus sever negative
effects of higher land rents on welfare. Then income redistribution can mitigate those negative effects
even if losing opportunities urban diversity provides. This interpretation is consistent with the result
that the region of the elasticity of substitution, where the optimal tax rate is decreasing in s, expands
as the average skill intensity Gs decreases (the left panel of Figure 6). The analysis here suggests that
the optimal income tax rate is determined by the interplay between two opposing components: the
distance of production technology from the dominance of monopolistic competition in terms of the
distribution of skill intensity and that from the dominance of constant returns to scale in terms of the
elasticity of substitution.
The above results then provide an important implication for a modern developed economy: As
Michaels et al. (2013) shows, we observe an increasing importance of interactive activities in devel-
oped countries such as the United States. In our model, this change in the nature of economic activity
32 We note that the analysis here is not exhaustive in the sense that we focus on a range of (s;Gs), where computational
errors associated with numerical solutions to the modified fundamental equation and numerical integration used when
calculating equilibrium utility are sufficiently small such that the objective function, i.e., equilibrium (log) utility as a
function of the income tax rate t, is relatively well approximated with cubic spline interpolation, an approximation method
used together with the golden section search when computing the optimal tax rate.
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Figure 6: Optimal Income Tax Rate, 100 t (%)
Note: Left panel: A darker color means a higher tax rate; The point (5:877;0:882) represents the benchmark case in which
case the optimal tax rate is about 0.6%; In the south east region, computational errors are relatively large due to a smaller
role of monopolistic competition implying equilibrium utility is less elastic with respect to parameters (s;Gs). Right
panel: The range of s above 8 is excluded because computational errors are relatively large.
can be interpreted in two ways, i.e., a right shift of the density of skill intensity or an increase in the
degree of product differentiation. The comparative statics then suggests that the desirable income
redistribution policies are not necessarily the same in both case.
As for the welfare gain from income redistribution, numerical results show that the relative mag-
nitude of each decomposed effect is the same as in the benchmark case, implying that although the
absolute magnitude of each effect varies depending on parameter values, a positive overall welfare
gain from income redistribution is a result of weakened negative effects of land rents compensating
lower urban diversity. Panel (a) in Figure 7 shows the overall welfare gain from the optimal income
redistribution policy, measured in terms of the increase in the equilibrium utility from the laissez-faire,
is positive but limited to a similar degree as the benchmark case,33 being in contrast to decomposed
effects, Panel (b)-(f), which vary widely depending on parameter values. However, signs and relative
magnitudes of those effects are the same as in the benchmark case. We also note that the welfare gain
from income redistribution has the same property as that from functional specialization, i.e., gains
tend to be larger when the distribution of skill intensity is close to a uniform.
33This result is consistent with that in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013) who use a totally different, neo-classical
framework with Marshallian externalities in both production and preference, showing that eliminating efficiency differences
across cities results in 1.2% increase in the U.S.
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Figure 7: Welfare Gain from Optimal Income Redistribution Policy and Optimal Tax Rate t
Note: Panels show the welfare effects of an optimal tax in terms of % increase in utility from the laissez-faire. A darker
color within a fixed panel means a higher welfare gain or a higher tax rate. Colors in different panels are not comparable.
The point (5:877;0:882) represents the benchmark case. For a given triplet (a;b; a˜), there is a negative relationship
between h and the average skill intensity Gs.
5 Conclusion
To formalize functional specialization of cities, this paper develops a static equilibrium model of a
system of cities in which ex ante identical locations specialize ex post in different sets of stages of
production, resulting in a unique, non-degenerate size distribution of cities with the comovement of
income, population, the wage rate, the land rent, the average establishment size in the the nonrou-
tine local services sector, and urban diversity as observed for the U.S. cities. The model is fairly
tractable in that the necessary and sufficient condition for the city size distribution to obey a power
law is analytically obtained. The analysis then takes a step further to analyses of welfare gains from
functional specialization and optimal income redistribution. Even if focusing on a static environment,
the welfare gain from functional specialization is large, but that from income redistribution is limited.
The latter analysis also provides an important implication of an increasing importance of interactive
activities in a modern developed economy for desirable income redistribution.
Given its simplicity, we hope that the model serves as a tool for further analyses of issues related
to specialization in a system of cities. Although not pursued in this paper, the model seems to be
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easily extended to introduce externalities both in preference and production, elements often employed
by recent quantitative studies such as Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013). In addition, the model
can also accommodate exogenous amenity or productivity differentials, which are also assumed in
previous studies, at least in two extreme cases: the ordering of cities in terms of skill intensity is
exactly the same as in the case of exogenous differentials; or it is exactly the contrary. The former
case is used as an approximation if exogenous amenities are important in determining the city size
distribution, e.g., Behrens et al. (2014b), while the latter could be used if interested in the “first nature
v.s. second nature” type of argument. Intermediate cases are complicated to analyze because there are
multiple distribution in equilibrium. In any case, extensions allow us to more deeply understand the
relationship between optimal income redistribution and the above elements as well as that between
comparative advantage and agglomeration and dispersion forces.
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A Why the ordering, 0= T1 < T2 <   < TJ = 1, holds
The following argument shows that the ordering of thresholds assumed in the text is only the relevant
case.
1. Suppose without loss of generality that jT jj < jT j+1j for all j.34 Then, we can show that
T j\T j0 = /0 for all j 6= j0. This is because if T j\T j0 6= /0 for some j 6= j0, then it must hold that
Pj(t)
Pj0(t)
=

Pn; j
Pn; j0
g(t) Pr; j
Pr; j0
1 g(t)
= 1 8t 2 T j \T j0 :
Since g(t) is strictly increasing, this is possible only if
Pn; j
Pn; j0
=
Pr; j
Pr; j0
= 1:
34 Of course, it is possible that jT jj= jT j0 j for some j and j0. However, if a shock to the economy is drawn from some
continuous distribution, such a case occurs with probability zero.
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However, this contradicts the fact that jT jj 6= jT j0 j, given that
Pr; j
Pr; j0
=

R j
R j0
bWj
Wj0
1 b
=
 jT jj
jT j0 j
a(1 b)+b
:
2. Furthermore, it holds that[ jT j = [0;1]. This is simply due to the fact that for any fixed t 2 [0;1],
there exists j that minimizes the costs of processing stage t.
3. Therefore, we can say that there exists a sequence of thresholds fTjg, implying that we can use
the condition for comparative advantage, i.e., Condition 5 in the definition of an equilibrium.
It is then implied that G j < G j+1 for all j.
4. Since T j \T j0 = /0 for any j 6= j0 and it must hold that jT jj < jT j+1j and G j < G j+1 for all j,
the sequence fTjg must be increasing. Otherwise, there exists j < j0, i.e., jT jj < jT j0 j, such
that G j > G j0 , which contradicts jT jj < jT j0 j under the assumption that (1 a)(1 b)qg(t) <
a(1 b)+b for all t 2 [0;1].
B Derivation of the Fundamental Equation
Reproduce the fundamental equation corresponding to the discrete case:
Tj+1 Tj
Tj Tj 1
a(1 b)+b (1 a)(1 b)qg(Tj)
=

G j+1
G j
qg(Tj)
;(19)
where
G j  1Tj Tj 1
Z Tj
Tj 1
g(t)dt:
In the limit, i.e., J!¥, each location specializes in a single stage of production. Therefore, each
location is characterized by its stage t 2 [0;1]. So, let F(t) denote the income Lorenz curve, i.e., F(t)
is equal to the accumulated income of locations that belong to [0; t].
Using this Lorenz curve, we then have the following approximation:
Tj+1 Tj
Tj Tj 1 =
F(t+Dt) F(t)
F(t) F(t Dt) ;(20)
where t and Dt correspond to j=J and 1=J, respectively. Using the asymptotic expansion, the right
hand side is expressed by
F(t+Dt) F(t)
F(t) F(t Dt) = 1+
F00(t)
F0(t)
Dt+o(jDtj);(21)
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where o() denotes the little o, i.e., as jDtj ! 0, o(jDtj)=jDtj ! 0.
We also have the following approximation:
G j+1 =
R F(t+Dt)
F(t) g(t)dt
F(t+Dt) F(t) = g(F(t))+
1
2
g0(F(t))F0(t)Dt+o(jDtj);
G j =
R F(t)
F(t Dt) g(t)dt
F(t) F(t Dt) = g(F(t)) 
1
2
g0(F(t))F0(t)Dt+o(jDtj):
Then,
G j+1
G j
= 1+
g0(F(t))F0(t)
g(F(t))
Dt+o(jDtj):(22)
Thus, substituting (20)-(22) into (19), we obtain
1+
F00(t)
F0(t)
Dt+o(jDtj)
a(1 b)+b (1 a)(1 b)qg(F(t))
=

1+
g0(F(t))F0(t)
g(F(t))
Dt+o(jDtj)
qg(F(t))
=) 1+[a(1 b)+b  (1 a)(1 b)qg(F(t))]F
00(t)
F0(t)
Dt+o(jDtj)
= 1+qg(F(t))
g0(F(t))F0(t)
g(F(t))
Dt+o(jDtj)
=) [a(1 b)+b  (1 a)(1 b)qg(F(t))]F
00(t)
F0(t)
+
o(jDtj)
Dt
= qg0(F(t))F0(t)+
o(jDtj)
Dt
=) [a(1 b)+b  (1 a)(1 b)qg(F(t))]F
00(t)
F0(t)
= qg0(F(t))F0(t) (Dt ! 0)
C Derivation of the Inverse Lorenz Curve H
As in the text, let H : z! t denote the inverse Lorenz curve, i.e., H(z)  F 1(z). By definition, it
satisfies
t = H(F(t));
which in turn implies that
1= H 0(F(t))F0(t) H 0(z)F0(t):(23)
Meanwhile, integrating the fundamental equation, we obtain
F0(t) µ [a(1 b)+b  (1 a)(1 b)qg(z)]  1(1 a)(1 b) :(24)
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Substituting (24) into (23), we then obtain
H 0(z) µ [a(1 b)+b  (1 a)(1 b)qg(z)] 1(1 a)(1 b)
=) H(z) = c0+ c1
Z z
0
G(u)
1
(1 a)(1 b) du;(25)
where c0 and c1 are undetermined constants. Using the boundary conditions, H(0) = F(0) = 0 and
H(1) =F(1) = 1, c0 and c1 are then determined by
c0 = 0;
c1 =
Z 1
0
G(u)
1
(1 a)(1 b) du
 1
;
implying the desired expression:
H(z) =
R z
0 G(u)
1
(1 a)(1 b) duR 1
0 G(u)
1
(1 a)(1 b) du
8z 2 [0;1]:
D Proof of Proposition 2
Here, we only show that (i) g0[g 1(B(l))]µ lh˜ if and only if g(t) is given as in Proposition 2; and that
(ii) the size distribution of cities is consistent with Zipf’s law if and only if h= a=[(1 a)(1 b)].
D.1 Determination of the Functional Form of g(t)
Define x by
x a(1 b)+b l
 1
(1 a)(1 b)q ;
with which we can rewrite g0[g 1(B(l))] µ lh˜ as follows:
g0[g 1(x)] µ (a  x) h˜; or 1
g0[g 1(x)]
µ (a  x)h˜:
Defining a function g by t = g(x) = g 1(x), we can interpret this as
g0(x) = c1(a  x)h˜; c1 > 0:(26)
Note that the function g must satisfy
g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1(27)
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since g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
Now, suppose that h˜= 1. We then obtain
t = g(x) = c0  c1 ln(a  x) and thus g(t) = a  exp

c0  t
c1

:(28)
Using the terminal condition (27), it is immediate to obtain
c0 =
lna
lna  ln(a 1) and c1 = [lna  ln(a 1)]
 1 ;
which together with (28) imply the desired result for h= h˜+1= 0.
As for the case of h˜ 6= 1, we can apply the similar method and obtain the desired result.
D.2 Determination of the Constraint on the Parameters for Zipf’s Law
Under the assumption that h 6= 0, the density function of l is given by
fL(l) µ l
 
h
1
(1 a)(1 b)+h+1
i
:
This implies that l obeys a Pareto distribution with coefficient of 1=[(1 a)(1 b)]+h.
Then, since F0(t) is related with l by
F0(t) µ l
1
(1 a)(1 b) ;
F0(t) obeys a Pareto distribution with coefficient of (1 a)(1 b)h+1.
Furthermore, since N(t) µ F0(t)1 a, N(t) obeys a Pareto distribution with coefficient of (1 
b)h+1=(1 a).
Finally, the definition of Zipf’s law, i.e., a Pareto distribution with unit coefficient, pins down the
desired value of h.
E Derivation of the Modified Fundamental Equation
Reproduce the modified fundamental equation:
 jT j+1j
jT jj
1 b[1+qg(Tj)](1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]jT j+1j+atJ 1
(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]jT jj+atJ 1
[a(1 b)+b][1+qg(Tj)]


(1 a)(1  t)jT j+1j+ tJ 1
(1 a)(1  t)jT jj+ tJ 1
 (1 b)[1+qg(Tj)]
=

G j+1
G j
qg(Tj)
8 j 2 f1;2;    ;J 1g;
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which contains
jT j+1j+ t˜iJ 1
jT jj+ t˜iJ 1 ; i= 1;2:
Because, replacing J 1 with Dt, we have
jT j+1j+ t˜iJ 1 = F(t+Dt) F(t)+ t˜iDt =

F0(t)+ t˜i

Dt+
1
2
F00(t)Dt2+o(jDtj)
jT jj+ t˜iJ 1 = F(t) F(t Dt)+ t˜iDt =

F0(t)+ t˜i

Dt  1
2
F00(t)Dt2+o(jDtj);
with the help of the asymptotic expansion, we can approximate the above term as follows:
jT j+1j+ t˜iJ 1
jT jj+ t˜iJ 1 = 1+
F00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜i
Dt+o(jDtj):
Then, substituting the following approximations into the modified fundamental equation, jT j+1j
jT jj
1 b[1+qg(Tj)]
=

1+
F00(t)
F0(t)
Dt+o(jDtj)
1 b[1+qg(F(t))]
= 1+f1 b[1+qg(F(t))]gF
00(t)
F0(t)
Dt+o(jDtj); jT j+1j+ t˜1J 1
jT jj+ t˜1J 1
[a(1 b)+b][1+qg(Tj)]
=

1+
F00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜1
Dt+o(jDtj)
[a(1 b)+b][1+qg(F(t))]
= 1+[a(1 b)+b][1+qg(F(t))] F
00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜1
Dt+o(jDtj); jT j+1j+ t˜2J 1
jT jj+ t˜2J 1
 (1 b)[1+qg(Tj)]
=

1+
F00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜2
Dt+o(jDtj)
 (1 b)[1+qg(F(t))]
= 1  (1 b)[1+qg(F(t))] F
00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜2
Dt+o(jDtj);
G j+1
G j
qg(Tj)
=

1+
g0(F(t))F0(t)
g(F(t))
Dt+o(jDtj)
qg(F(t))
= 1+qg(F(t))
g0(F(t))F0(t)
g(F(t))
Dt+o(jDtj);
and rearranging the result, we obtain the modified fundamental equation.
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F Derivation of Profiles
F.1 Land Rent R(t)
From the text, we have
R j+1
R j
=
jT j+1j+ t˜1J 1
jT jj+ t˜1J 1 ;
J
å
j=1
R j =
(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]+at
1 a(1  t) ;
where we invoke the normalization of the total income, i.e., E = 1, as in the text.
Using the asymptotic expansion, the former can be written as follows:
R(t+Dt)
R(t)
= 1+
F00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜1
Dt+o(jDtj)
=) 1
R(t)
R(t+Dt) R(t)
Dt
=
F00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜1
+
o(jDtj)
Dt
=) R
0(t)
R(t)
=
F00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜1
(Dt ! 0)
=) lnR(t) = c0+ ln[F0(t)+ t˜1]
=) R(t) = c˜0[F0(t)+ t˜1]:
Integrating the last expression, we then obtain
Z 1
0
R(t)dt =
J
å
j=1
R j =
(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]+at
1 a(1  t) = c˜0
Z 1
0
F0(t)dt+ t˜1

= c˜0(1+ t˜1)
c˜0 =
(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]
1 a(1  t) ;
where the last equality of the first line uses the fact that F(0) = 0 and F(1) = 1.
Therefore, we have
R(t) =
(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]
1 a(1  t) [F
0(t)+ t˜1]
= [1 a(1  t)] 1(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]F0(t)+at	 :
F.2 Population N(t)
From the text, we have
N j+1
N j
=
jT j+1j+ t˜2J 1
jT jj+ t˜2J 1
 jT j+1j+ t˜1J 1
jT jj+ t˜1J 1
 a
;
38
which is in turn approximated as follows:
N(t+Dt)
N(t)
=

1+
F00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜2
Dt+o(jDtj)

1+
F00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜1
Dt+o(jDtj)
 a
=

1+
F00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜2
Dt+o(jDtj)

1 a F
00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜1
Dt+o(jDtj)

= 1+

F00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜2
 a F
00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜1

Dt+o(jDtj):
Integrating both sides, arranging the result and taking the limit (Dt ! 0), we then obtain
N0(t)
N(t)
=
F00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜2
 a F
00(t)
F0(t)+ t˜1
=) lnN(t) = cˆ0+ ln[F0(t)+ t˜2] a ln[F(t)+ t˜1]
=) N(t) = ecˆ0 F0(t)+ t˜2F0(t)+ t˜1 a ; or
N(t) = ec0

(1 a)(1  t)F0(t)+ t(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]F0(t)+at	 a ;
where c0 satisfies
ecˆ0 = ec0(1 a)(1  t)f(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]g a :
Here, c0 should be consistent with the normalized total population, i.e.,
R 1
0 N(t)dt = 1.
F.3 Wage RateW (t)
From the labor market clearing condition in the text, we have
Wj+1N j+1
WjN j
=
jT j+1j
jT jj ;
J
å
j=1
WjN j = (1 a)(1 b);
where we invoked the normalization of the total income, i.e., E = 1.
Defining the local labor income M j by M j =WjN j, we can approximate the above first equation
as follows:
M(t+Dt)
M(t)
= 1+
F00(t)
F0(t)
Dt+o(jDtj):
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Therefore, we have
M0(t)
M(t)
=
F00(t)
F0(t)
=) lnM(t) = c0+ lnF0(t)
=) M(t) = c˜0F0(t);
where c˜0 is determined by integrating both sides and using the above result:
Z 1
0
M(t)dt =
J
å
j=1
WjN j = (1 a)(1 b) = c˜0
Z 1
0
F0(t)dt = c˜0:
This implies that
M(t) =W (t)N(t) = (1 a)(1 b)F0(t) =) W (t) = (1 a)(1 b)F
0(t)
N(t)
:
F.4 Urban Diversity D(t)
Reproduce the market clearing condition for the nonroutine service sector:
D jpn; jq= (1 a)G jjT jj= (1 a)
Z Tj
Tj 1
g(t)dt;
where
pn; j = (1+q)mR
b
jW
1 a
j ; q=
f
qm
:
This suggests that
D(t)
(1+q) f
q
R(t)bW (t)1 bdt = (1 a)g(F(t))F0(t)dt
=) D(t) = q
(1+q) f
(1 a)g(F(t))F0(t)R(t) bW (t) (1 b):
F.5 After-tax Local Income Ea(t)
From the text, we have
Ea; j = (1  t)Eb; j+ tJ 1 = (1  t)(WjN j+R j)+ tJ 1;
where the normalization of the total income, i.e., E = 1, is used.
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This then suggests that
Ea(t)dt = (1  t)[W (t)N(t)+R(t)]dt+ tdt
= (1  t)[M(t)+R(t)]dt+ tdt
=) Ea(t) = (1  t)[M(t)+R(t)]+ t:
Substituting
M(t)+R(t) = (1 a)(1 b)F0(t)+ [1 a(1  t)] 1(1 a)[a(1 b)(1  t)+b]F0(t)+at	
= [1 a(1  t)] 1[(1 a)F0(t)+at]
into the above equation, we obtain
Ea(t) = [1 a(1  t)] 1[(1 a)(1  t)F0(t)+ t]:
F.6 Natural Logarithm of the Price Index lnP of the Final Good
In a sorting equilibrium, each location t specializes in a stage of production with skill intensity of
z=F(t). Then, the Cobb-Douglas technology implies that
lnP=
Z 1
0
ln[P(F 1(z))]dz;
where P(t) denotes the location-t unit cost of processing stage with z = F(t). The change of the
variable then implies
lnP=
Z 1
0
ln[P(t)]F0(t)dt:
Meanwhile, the unit cost P(t) of processing a stage with skill intensity of F(t) is given by
P(t) = Pn(t)g(F(t))Pr(t)1 g(F(t)):
Substituting the unit costs, Pn(t) and Pr(t), of local service sectors
Pn(t) = (1+q)mR(t)bW (t)1 bD(t) q;
Pr(t) = R(t)bW (t)1 b
into the equation, it follows that
P(t) = [(1+q)m]g(F(t))R(t)bW (t)1 bD(t) qg(F(t));
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which, with the help of normalization, (1+q)m= 1, becomes
P(t) = R(t)bW (t)1 bD(t) qg(F(t)):
Therefore, we have
lnP=
Z 1
0
[b lnR(t)+(1 b)W (t) qg(F(t))D(t)]F0(t)dt:
G Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the model to the U.S. data. We describe our procedure and the data we use
in Subsection G.1 and G.2, respectively. The result of the calibration is then presented in Subsection
G.3. Our purpose is not testing the model. Instead, we simply intend to pick up an example of values
of parameters used as a benchmark in numerical exercises conducted in Subsections 3.4 and 4.3 in
such a way that the model roughly matches the data.
G.1 Procedure
In order to compute the equilibrium numerically, we need to specify the values of the parameters
(a;b;s; a˜;h). The first two are calibrated independently, and the other by matching the model with
the U.S. data in terms of the upper tail of the distribution of market sizes of MSAs. Without loss of
generality, f = 1 and (1+q)m= 1.
Expenditure Share a of Land
Let A, B, and C denote the expenditure share of land, housing (excluding land), and goods and ser-
vices, respectively, i.e., A+B+C = 1. According to Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011), the housing
expenditure (including land) A+B = 0:24. In addition, Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) report that the
one-third of housing costs are due to land, implying A= 1=3 (A+B). Since there is no housing in
the model, the expenditure share a of land is then calculated by a= A=(A+C) 0:095.
Cost Share b of Land
Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) report sectoral income shares of land, structures, and equipments,
the summation of which corresponds to the capital share. Let Aˆ, Bˆ, and Cˆ denote the income shares
of land, structures and equipments, and labor, respectively, i.e., Aˆ+ Bˆ+ Cˆ = 1. If we focus on the
services sector, Aˆ = 0:06, and Cˆ = 0:65 according to Table 5 in Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008).
Since production factors in our model consist of land and labor only, we can calculate b by b =
Aˆ=(Aˆ+Cˆ) 0:085.
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Parameter Meaning Restriction Target Source
a Expenditure share of land (0;1) Expenditure share of land Albouy and Ehrlich (2012)
Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011)
b Cost share of land (0;1) Cost share of land Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008)
s Elasticity of substitution (maxf1; [a(1 b)+b] 1g;+¥) Max-Min ratio of labor compensation Occupational Employment Statistics
a˜ Parameter of g(t) (1;+¥) Distribution of labor compensations Occupational Employment Statistics
h Parameter of g(t) ( ¥;+¥) do. do.
Table 4: Restrictions on and Targets of the Calibrated Parameters
Other Parameters (s; a˜;h)
The elasticity s= 1=q+1 of substitution is calibrated in such a way that the model can exactly match
the natural logarithm of the observed max-min ratio of the market size, which is given by
ln

F0(1)
F0(0)

data
=
1
(1 a)(1 b) ln

a(1 b)+b
a(1 b)+b  (1 a)(1 b)q

:
As for (a˜;h), we solve the following constrained minimization problem in a brute force manner
with a discretized parameter space:
min
a˜;h
max
i2f1;2; ;Nˆg
Fˆ(mi) F(mi; a˜;h) s:t: a˜> 1;
where Fˆ and F are the distribution functions of the natural logarithm of the market size for the data
and the model, respectively. Nˆ is the sample size of MSAs, andmi is the actual normalized market size
of ith MSA. Table 4 summarizes the restrictions on and targets of the calibrated parameters, where
the lower bound for the elasticity s of substitution takes account of the assumption that G(1) > 0 in
Proposition 1.
G.2 Data
The data that we use in the calibration are taken from theMay 2011 Occupational Employment Statis-
tics compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which reports the number of employments and the
average annual wage rates for occupations listed in the 2010 Standard Occupational Classification
System for each of the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). We then exploit the equivalence be-
tween the normalized market size of an MSA and the normalized total labor compensation due to the
constancy of the labor cost share 1 b in order to construct the distribution of the natural logarithm
of the market size from the data on labor compensation. Focusing on the upper tail of the distribution
results in the sample size of 342 MSAs which is not particularly different from those in previous
studies such as Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007). The implied max-min ration of market sizes is
5.304.
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Figure 8: Cumulative Distribution Function of the Normalized Market Size
Note: The cumulative distribution of the data is constructed using labor compensations of the top 342 MSAs.
Source: May 2011 Occupational Employment Statistics.
G.3 Result
The results of the calibration are reported in Table 1. The elasticity s of substitution falls in the
typical range, [5;10], in the (international) literatures such as Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). As
shown in Figure 8, the model replicates the observed distribution of the natural logarithm of market
sizes with the maximal deviation of 2.0%.
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